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Distributed Spectrum Access with Spatial Reuse
Xu Chen∗ and Jianwei Huang∗
Abstract
Efficient distributed spectrum sharing mechanism is crucial for improving the spectrum utilization. The spatial
aspect of spectrum sharing, however, is less understood than many other aspects. In this paper, we generalize a
recently proposed spatial congestion game framework to design efficient distributed spectrum access mechanisms
with spatial reuse. We first propose a spatial channel selection game to model the distributed channel selection
problem with fixed user locations. We show that the game is a potential game, and develop a distributed learning
mechanism that converges to a Nash equilibrium only based on users’ local observations. We then formulate the
joint channel and location selection problem as a spatial channel selection and mobility game, and show that it
is also a potential game. We next propose a distributed strategic mobility algorithm, jointly with the distributed
learning mechanism, that can converge to a Nash equilibrium. Numerical results show that the Nash equilibria
achieved by the proposed algorithms have only less than 8% performance loss, compared with the centralized
optimal solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic spectrum sharing is envisioned as a promising technique to alleviate the problem of spectrum
under-utilization [1]. It enables unlicensed wireless users (secondary users) to opportunistically access the
licensed channels owned by legacy spectrum holders (primary users), and thus can significantly improve
the spectrum efficiency [2].
A key challenge of dynamic spectrum sharing is how to resolve the resource competition by selfish
secondary users in a decentralized fashion. If multiple secondary users transmit over the same channel
simultaneously, it may lead to severe interference and reduced data rates for all users. Therefore, it is
necessary to design efficient distributed spectrum sharing mechanism.
The competitions among secondary users for common spectrum resources have often been studied using
noncooperative game theory (e.g., [3]–[7]). Nie and Comaniciu in [4] designed a self-enforcing distributed
spectrum access mechanism based on potential games. Niyato and Hossain in [5] studied a price-based
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2Fig. 1. Illustration of distributed spectrum access with spatial reuse
spectrum access mechanism for competitive secondary users. Flegyhzi et al. in [6] proposed a two-tier
game framework for medium access control (MAC) mechanism design. Law et al. in [7] studied the
system performance degradation due to users’ selfish behaviors in spectrum access games.
When not knowing spectrum information such as channel availabilities, secondary users need to learn the
environment and adapt the spectrum access decisions accordingly. Han et al. in [8] and Maskery et al. in
[9] used no-regret learning to solve this problem, assuming that the users’ channel selections are common
information. The learning converges to a correlated equilibrium [10], wherein the commonly observed
history serves as a signal to coordinate all users’ channel selections. When users’ channel selections
are not observable, authors in [11]–[13] designed multi-agent multi-armed bandit learning algorithms to
minimize the expected performance loss of distributed spectrum access.
A common assumption of the above results is that secondary users are close-by and interfere with each
other when they transmit on the same channel simultaneously. However, a critical feature of spectrum
sharing in wireless communication is spatial reuse. If wireless users are located sufficiently far apart, then
they can transmit in the same frequency band simultaneously without causing any performance degradation
(see Figure 1 for an illustration). Such spatial effect on distributed spectrum sharing is less understood
than many other aspects in existing literature [14], which motivates this study.
Recently, Tekin et al. in [15] and Southwell et al. in [16] proposed a novel spatial congestion game
framework to take spatial relationship into account. The key idea is to extend the classical congestion
game upon a general undirected graph, by assuming that a player’s payoff depends on the number of its
neighbors that choose the same resource (i.e., users are homogeneous in terms of channel contention). The
homogeneous assumption follows from the set up of the classical congestion game (which only works on
3a fully connected graph). The application of such a homogeneous model, however, is quite restricted, since
users typically have heterogenous channel contention probabilities in wireless systems. For example, users
of heterogeneous wireless channel conditions may have heterogeneous packet transmission error rates,
which in turn result in heterogeneous channel contention window sizes at the equilibrium according to the
distributed coordination function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 networks [17]. This implies that users would have
heterogeneous channel contention probabilities if they have heterogeneous equilibrium contention window
sizes. As another example, users running heterogeneous applications would have heterogeneous channel
access priorities according to the enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA) mechanism of IEEE 802.11e
networks [18]. In this paper, we extend the spatial congestion game framework to formulate the random
access based distributed spectrum sharing problem with spatial reuse, by taking users’ heterogeneous
channel contention probabilities into account. Such extension is highly non-trivial, and significantly
expands possible applications of the model. Moreover, we propose distributed algorithms to achieve Nash
equilibria of the generalized spatial games.
We consider two game models in this paper. In the first model, secondary users have fixed spectrum
access locations, and each user selects a channel to maximize its own utility in a distributed manner.
We model the problem as a spatial channel selection game. In the second more general model, users are
mobile, and they are capable to select channels and spectrum access locations simultaneously in order to
better exploit the gain of spatial reuse. We formulate the problem as a joint spatial channel selection and
mobility game. The main results and contributions of this paper are as follows:
• General game formulation: We formulate the spatial channel selection problem and the joint chan-
nel and location selection problem as noncooperative games on general interference graphs, with
heterogeneous channel available data rates depending on user and location.
• Existence of Nash equilibrium and finite improvement property: For both the spatial channel selection
game and the joint spatial channel selection and mobility game, we show that they are potential
games, and hence they always have at least one Nash equilibrium and possess the finite improvement
property.
• Distributed algorithms for achieving Nash equilibrium: For the spatial channel selection game, we
propose a distributed learning algorithm, which globally converges to a Nash equilibrium by only
utilizing users’ local observations. For the spatial channel selection and mobility game, we propose
a distributed strategic mobility algorithm, which also converges to a Nash equilibrium, when jointly
4used with the distributed learning algorithm.
• Superior performance: Numerical results show that the Nash equilibria achieved by the proposed
algorithms have only less than 8% performance loss, compared with the centralized optimal solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model and the spatial channel
selection game in Sections II and III, respectively. We present the distributed learning mechanism for
spatial channel selection in Section IV. Then we introduce the joint spatial channel selection and mobility
game in Section V, and study the uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in Section VI. We
illustrate the performance of the proposed mechanisms through numerical results in Section VII, and
finally conclude in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a dynamic spectrum sharing network with a set M = {1, 2, ...,M} of independent
and stochastically heterogeneous primary channels. A set N = {1, 2, ..., N} of secondary users try to
access these channels in a distributed manner when the channels are not occupied by primary (licensed)
transmissions.
To take the spatial relationship into account, we assume that the secondary users are located in a spatial
domain △, i.e., a finite set of possible spectrum access locations. We denote dn ∈ △ as the location
of user n, and d = (d1, .., dN) ∈ Π , △N as location profile of all users. Each secondary user has a
transmission range δ. Then given the location profile d of all users, we can obtain the interference
graph Gd = {N , Ed} to describe the interference relationship among users (see Figure 1 for an example).
Here vertex set N is the secondary user set, and edge set Ed = {(i, j) : ||di, dj|| ≤ δ, ∀i, j 6= i ∈ N} is
the set of interference edges (with ||di, dj|| being the distance between locations di and dj). If there is an
interference edge between two secondary users, then they cannot successfully transmit their data on the
same idle channel simultaneously due to collision. In the sequel, we also denote the set of interfering users
with user n (i.e., user n’s “neighbors”) under the location profile d as Nn(d) = {i : (n, i) ∈ Ed, i ∈ N}.
We consider a time-slotted system model as follows:
• Channel state: for each primary channel m, the channel state at time slot t is
Sm(t) =


0 if channel m is occupied by primary transmissions,
1 if channel m is idle.
5Fig. 2. Two states Markovian channel model
• Channel state changing: the state of a channel changes according to a two-state Markovian process
[19], [20] (see Figure 2). We denote the channel state probability vector of channel m at time t
as qm(t) , (Pr{Sm(t) = 0}, P r{Sm(t) = 1}), which forms a Markov chain as qm(t) = qm(t −
1)Γm, ∀t ≥ 1, with the transition matrix
Γm =

 1− εm εm
ξm 1− ξm

 .
Furthermore, the long run statistical channel availability θm ∈ (0, 1) of a channel m can be obtained
from the stationary distribution of the Markov chain, i.e.,
θm =
εm
εm + ξm
. (1)
• User-and-location specific channel throughput: for each secondary user n at location d, its realized
data rate bnm,d(t) on an idle channel m in each time slot t evolves according to an i.i.d. random process
with a mean Bnm,d, due to users’ heterogeneous transmission technologies and the local environmental
effects such as fading [21]. For example, we can compute the data rate bnm,d(t) according to the
Shannon capacity as
bnm,d(t) = Bm log2
(
1 +
ζng
n
m,d(t)
ωnm,d
)
, (2)
where Bm is the bandwidth of channel m, ζn is the fixed transmission power adopted by user n
according to the requirements such as the primary user protection, ωnm,d denotes the background
noise power, and gnm,d(t) is the channel gain. In a Rayleigh fading channel environment, the channel
gain gnm,d(t) is a realization of a random variable that follows the exponential distribution [21].
• Time slot structure: each secondary user n executes the following stages synchronously during each
time slot:
6– Channel sensing: sense one of the channels based on the channel selection decision generated
at the end of previous time slot1.
– Channel contention: we use persistence-probability-based random access mechanism2, i.e., user n
contends for an idle channel with probability pn ∈ ̺ , (pmin, pmax), where 0 < pmin < pmax < 1
denote the minimum and maximum contention probabilities. If multiple users contend for the
same channel, a collision occurs and no user can transmit. Since each user (i.e., a wireless
device) typically has limited battery, to achieve a longer expected lifetime, we limit user’s channel
contention in a time slot as
ζnpn ≤ νn, (3)
where νn denotes the energy constraint of user n.
– Data transmission: transmit data packets if the user is the only one contending for an idle channel
(i.e., no collision is detected).
– Channel selection: choose a channel to access next time slot according to the distributed learning
mechanism (introduced in Section IV).
Let an ∈ M be the channel selected by user n, a = (a1, ..., aN) ∈ Λ ,MN be the channel selection
profile of all users, and p = (p1, ..., pN) be the channel contention probability profile of all users. We can
then obtain the long run expected throughput of each user n choosing channel an in location dn as
Qn(d,a,p) = θanB
n
an,dn
pn
∏
i∈N ann (d,a)
(1− pi), (4)
where N ann (d,a) , {i : ai = an and i ∈ Nn(d)} is the set of interfering users that choose the same
channel as user n. To take the fairness issue into account, we consider the proportional-fair utility [23]
function in this study, i.e.,
Un(d,a,p) = logQn(d,a,p). (5)
1This paper focuses on studying the spatial aspect on distributed spectrum sharing, by assuming that users are capable of perfect spectrum
sensing. If a user has imperfect spectrum sensing, it would lead to a lower spectrum utilization for the user. For example, false-alarm
mistakenly reports an idle channel as busy and hence results in a waste of spectrum opportunities. Missed detection mistakenly reports a
busy channel as idle and results in a transmission collision with primary users. In this case, we can add a value say λn into the throughput
function in (4), which describes the performance of user’s spectrum sensing. If λn = 1, the user has the perfect spectrum sharing. If λn < 1,
the user has the imperfect spectrum sensing. However, since the variable λn does not depend on other secondary users’ activities, the analysis
in this paper is still valid.
2This model can also provide useful insights for the case that the contention-window-based random access mechanism is implemented,
since the persistence probability pn is related to the contention window size wn according to pn = 2wn+1 [22].
7Other type of utility functions such as general alpha-fairness will be considered in a future work.
Equation (5) shows that user n’s utility Un(d,a,p) is an increasing function of its contention prob-
ability pn. This implies that, when a user is aggressive and does not care about the collisions, it can
adopt the maximum possible channel contention probability pn satisfying the energy constraint (3), i.e.,
pn = min{pmax,
νn
ζn
}. When users take the cost of collisions into account, we can adopt the game theoretic
framework for the contention control in [24]. Furthermore, a dynamic contention control scheme is
proposed in [24] that converges to a stable channel contention probability profile such that no users
can further improve unilaterally. In this paper, we hence assume that the channel contention probability
pn of each user is fixed and focus on the issues of distributed location and channel selections. For the sake
of brevity, we also denote the utility of each user n as Un(d,a), where the decision variables are location
selections d and channel selections a only. Since our analysis is from the secondary users’ perspective,
we will use the terms “secondary user” and “user” interchangeably.
III. SPATIAL CHANNEL SELECTION
We first consider the case that all users’ locations d are fixed, and each user tries to maximize its own
utility by choosing a proper channel in a distributed manner. Given other users’ channel selections a−n,
the problem faced by a user n is
max
an∈M
Un(d, an, a−n), ∀n ∈ N . (6)
The distributed nature of the spatial channel selection problem naturally leads to a formulation based on
game theory, such that each user can self organize into a mutually acceptable channel selection (Nash
equilibrium) a∗ = (a∗1, a∗2, ..., a∗N ) with
a∗n = arg max
an∈M
Un(d, an, a
∗
−n), ∀n ∈ N . (7)
We next formulate the spatial channel selection problem as a game, and further show the existence of
Nash equilibrium.
A. Spatial Congestion Game
We first review the spatial congestion game introduced in [15]. Spatial congestion games are a class of
strategic games represented by Γ = (N ,M, {Nn(d)}n∈N , {Un}n∈N ). Specifically, N is the set of players,
8M is the set of resources, and Nn(d) is the set of players that can cause congestion to player n when
they use the same resource. The payoff of player n for using resource an ∈M is Un(a) = fnan(C
n
an
(a)),
where Cnan(a) =
∑
i∈Nn(d)
I{ai=an} denotes the number of players in the set Nn(d) that choose the same
resource an as user n, and fnan(·) denotes some user-specific payoff function. Typically, Cnan(a) is also
called the congestion level.
Note that the classical congestion games can be viewed as a special case of the spatial congestion
games by setting the interference graph Gd as a complete graph, i.e., Nn(d) = N\{n}. For the classical
congestion game, it is shown in [25] that it is an (exact) potential game, which is defined as
Definition 1 (Potential Game [25]). A game is called a weighted potential game if it admits a potential
function Φ(a) such that for every n ∈ N and a−n ∈MN−1,
Φ(a
′
n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n) = wn
(
Un(a
′
n, a−n)− Un(an, a−n)
)
,
where wn > 0 is some positive constant. Specifically, if wn = 1, ∀n ∈ N , then the game is also called an
exact potential game.
Definition 2 (Better Response Update [25]). The event where a player n changes to an action a′n from
the action an is a better response update if and only if Un(a′n, a−n) > Un(an, a−n).
Definition 3 (Finite Improvement Property [25]). A game has the finite improvement property if any
asynchronous better response update process (i.e., no more than one player updates the strategy at any
given time) terminates at a pure Nash equilibrium within a finite number of updates.
An appealing property of the potential game is that it admits the finite improvement property, which
guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium. When a general payoff function fnan(·) is considered,
however, the spatial congestion game does not necessarily possess such a nice property [15]. We next
extend the spatial congestion game framework for the random access mechanism in Section II, and show
that the spatial channel selection problem in (6) with the payoff function given in (5) is a potential game.
B. Generalized Spatial Congestion Game Formulation
As mentioned, the spatial congestion game proposed in [15] assumes that a player’s utility depends on
the number of players in its neighbors that choose the same resource. For our case, however, a user’s
utility in (5) depends on who (instead of how many users) in its neighbors contend for the same channel,
9since users have heterogenous channel contention probabilities. We hence generalize the spatial congestion
game framework for the random access mechanism in Section II by extending the definition of congestion
level Cnan(a). According to (4) and (5), we have
Un(d,a) = log
(
θanB
n
an,dn
pn
)
+
∑
i∈N ann (d,a)
log(1− pi).
We then extend the definition of Cnan(a) in the standard spatial congestion game by setting Cnan(a) =∑
i∈N ann (d,a)
log(1− pi). Here Cnan(a) is regarded as the generalized congestion level perceived by user n
on channel an. When all users have the same channel contention probability pi = p, we have Cnan(a) =
log(1−p)
∑
i∈N ann (d,a)
I{ai=an}, which degrades to the standard case. Then the user specific payoff function
is fnan(C
n
an
(a)) = log
(
θanB
n
an,dn
pn
)
+Cnan(a). In the following, we refer to this game formulation as the
spatial channel selection game. We show that
Lemma 1. The spatial channel selection game on a general interference graph Gd is a weighted potential
game, with the potential function as
Φ(d,a) =
N∑
i=1
− log(1− pi)

1
2
∑
j∈N
ai
i (d,a)
log(1− pj) + log
(
θaiB
i
ai,di
pi
) , (8)
and the weight wi = − log(1− pi).
The proof is given in Appendix A. It follows from Lemma 1 that
Theorem 1. The spatial channel selection game on a general interference graph has a Nash equilibrium
and the finite improvement property.
By the finite improvement property, any asynchronous better response update leads to a Nash equilib-
rium. However, the better response update requires each user to know the strategies of other users, and
then takes a better strategy to improve its payoff. This requires extensive information exchange among
the users. The signaling overhead and energy consumption can be quite significant and even infeasible in
some network scenarios. We next propose a distributed learning mechanism, which utilizes user’s local
observations only and converges to a Nash equilibrium.
IV. DISTRIBUTED LEARNING MECHANISM FOR SPATIAL CHANNEL SELECTION
In this part, we introduce the distributed learning mechanism for spatial channel selection, and then
show that it converges to a Nash equilibrium.
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A. Distributed Learning Mechanism
Without information exchange, each user can only estimate the environment through local measurement.
To achieve accurate estimation, a user needs to gather a large number of observation samples. This
motivates us to divide the learning time into a sequence of decision periods indexed by T (= 1, 2, ...),
where each decision period consists of K time slots (see Figure 3). During a single decision period, a
user accesses the same channel in all K time slots. Thus the total number of users accessing each channel
does not change within a decision period, which allows users to better learn the environment.
The key idea of distributed learning here is to adapt a user’s spectrum access decision based on its
accumulated experiences. At the beginning of each period T , a user n chooses a channel an(T ) ∈M to
access according to its mixed strategy σn(T ) = (σnm(T ), ∀m ∈ M), where σnm(T ) is the probability of
choosing channel m. The mixed strategy is generated according to Zn(T ) = (Znm(T ), ∀m ∈ M), which
represents its perceptions of choosing different channels based on local estimations. We map from the
perceptions Zn(T ) to the mixed strategy σn(T ) in the proportional way, i.e.,
σnm(T ) =
Znm(T )∑M
i=1 Z
n
i (T )
, ∀m ∈M. (9)
At the end of a decision period T , a user n computes its estimated expected payoff Un(T ) based on
the sample average estimation over K time slots in the period, i.e., Un(T ) =
∑K
t=1 Un(T,t)
K
where Un(T, t)
is the payoff received by user n in time slot t. Then user n adjusts its perceptions as
Znm(T + 1) =
Znm(T )∑M
i=1 Z
n
i (T )
+ µTUn(T )I{an(T )=m}, ∀m ∈M, (10)
where µT is the smoothing factor and I{an(T )=m} is an indicator whether user n chooses channel m
at period T . The user first normalizes the perception values (the first term on RHS of (10)) and then
reinforces the perception of the channel just accessed (the second term on RHS of (10)). The purpose of
normalization here is to bound the perception values. We summarize the distributed learning mechanism
for spatial channel selection in Algorithm 1.
We then analyze the computational complexity of the distributed learning algorithm. For each iteration
of each user, Line 5 involves M division operations in (9). This step has the complexity of O(M).
Similarly, Line 11 has the complexity of O(M). Lines 6 to 9 involves K channel contention in K time
slots and hence have the complexity of O(K). Line 10 involves K summation operations, which also
has the complexity of O(K). Suppose that it takes C iterations for the algorithm to converge. Then total
11
Fig. 3. Time structure of distributed learning
Algorithm 1 Distributed Learning For Spatial Channel Selection
1: initialization:
2: set the initial perception value Zn(1) = ( 1M , ...,
1
M
).
3: end initialization
4: loop for each decision period T and each user n in parallel:
5: select a channel an(T ) ∈M according to the mixed strategy σn(T ) by (9).
6: for each time slot t in the period T do
7: sense and contend to access the channel an(T ).
8: record the realized utility Un(T, t)
9: end for
10: calculate the average utility Un(T ) =
∑K
t=1 Un(T,t)
K
.
11: update the perception values Zn(T ) according to (10).
12: end loop
computational complexity of the distributed learning algorithm of N users is O(CNK + CNM).
B. Dynamics of Distributed Learning
We then study the dynamics of distributed learning mechanism, which provide useful insights for the
convergence of the learning mechanism.
First of all, it is easy to show that learning procedures in (9) and (10) correspond to the following
discrete time dynamics.
Lemma 2. For the distributed learning mechanism for spatial channel selection, the discrete time dynamics
are given as
σnm(T + 1) = σ
n
m(T ) +
µTUn(T )(I{an(T )=m} − σ
n
m(T ))
1 + µTUn(T )
, ∀m ∈M, n ∈ N . (11)
Since the updated perception value Znm(T ) depends on the estimated payoff Un(T ), Znm(T ) is thus a
random variable. The equations in (11) are hence stochastic difference equations, which are difficult to
analyze directly. Based on the stochastic approximation theory [26], we then focus on the analysis of its
mean dynamics, which has the same convergence equilibrium as the discrete dynamics (11).
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To proceed, we define the mapping from the mixed strategies σ(T ) to the expected payoff of user n
choosing channel m as V nm(σ(T )) , E[Un(T )|σ(T ), an(T ) = m]. Here the expectation E[·] is taken with
respect to the mixed strategy profile σ(T ) of all users. We show that
Lemma 3. For the distributed learning mechanism for spatial channel selection, when smoothing factor
µT satisfies
∑
T µT = ∞ and
∑
T µ
2
T < ∞, then as T goes to infinity, the sequence {σ(T ), ∀T ≥ 0}
converges to the limiting point of the differential equations
dσnm(T )
dT
= σnm(T )
(
V nm(σ(T ))−
M∑
i=1
σni (T )V
n
i (σ(T ))
)
, ∀m ∈M, n ∈ N . (12)
The proof is given in Appendix B. The mean dynamics in (12) imply that for a user if a channel
offers a better payoff than his current average payoff, then the user will choose that channel with a higher
probability in future learning.
C. Convergence of Distributed Learning
We now study the convergence of the mean dynamics in (12). To proceed, we first define the following
functions
L(σ(T )) , E[Φ(d,a)|σ(T )], (13)
and
Lni (σ(T )) , E[Φ(d,a)|σ(T ), an(T ) = i]. (14)
Here L(σ(T )) is the expected value of the potential function Φ given the mixed strategy profile σ(T ),
and Lni (σ(T )) is the expected value of Φ given that user n chooses channel n and other users adhere to
the mixed strategy profile σ(T ). We show that
Lemma 4. Lni (σ(T ))− Lnj (σ(T )) = − log(1− pn)
(
V ni (σ(T ))− V
n
j (σ(T ))
)
, ∀i, j ∈M, n ∈ N .
The proof is given in Appendix C. This lemma implies that the potential function of the spatial channel
selection game in (8) also holds in the expectation sense. Based on Lemma 4, we show that
Theorem 2. When smoothing factor µT satisfies
∑
T µT =∞ and
∑
T µ
2
T <∞, the distributed learning
mechanism for spatial channel selection asymptotically converges to a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix D. The key idea is to show that the time derivative of L(σ(T )) is
non-decreasing, i.e., dL(σ(T ))
dT
≥ 0. Since L(σ(T )) is bounded above, the learning dynamics must converge
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to an invariant set such that dL(σ(T ))
dT
= 0, which corresponds to the set of Nash equilibria.
V. JOINT SPATIAL CHANNEL SELECTION AND MOBILITY
Future mobile devices are envisioned to incorporate the intelligent functionality and will be capable of
flexible spectrum access [27]. Most existing efforts (e.g., [3]–[13]), however, focus on spectrum sharing
networks with stationary secondary users. How to better utilize the gain of spatial reuse in mobile cognitive
radio networks is less understood. Due to the heterogeneous geo-locations of primary users, the spectrum
availabilities can be very different over the spatial dimension. A secondary user can achieve higher
throughput if it moves to a location with higher spectrum opportunities and fewer contending users.
This motivates us to consider the throughput-driven mobility case that each user has the flexibility to
change both its spectrum access location and channel.
We note that the idea of strategic mobility is not necessarily applicable to all communication scenarios.
For example, in vehicular ad-hoc networks, user’s mobility is typically generated by user’s driving plan,
thus the idea of strategic mobility for better network throughput may not apply. However, there are
some networking scenarios where strategic mobility can be very useful. For example, in areas of poor
connectivity, cellular phone users often try to find a location with better connectivity by moving around
and observing the signal strength bars. As another example, in many large academic conferences, a user
often experiences poor Wi-Fi connections in a conference room with a lot of attendees. The connection
gets much better when the user moves into the conference lobby just tens of meters away with much fewer
users. To summarize, a user has the incentive to move if he has to complete an urgent communication
task and the movement is within a reasonable distance.
Strategic mobility has also been discussed in several related literature. Satyanarayanan in [28] has
proposed the strategic mobility for better network service as an important function of pervasive computing.
An envisioned scenario is that a software agent can intelligently gather information from both the network
and user and provide appropriate suggestions about location changing to the user so that the user can
achieve a better communication performance. Inspired by this, Balachandran et al. in [29] proposed a
network-directed roaming approach to relieve congestion in public area wireless access point networks.
When an access point (i.e., a location) is over-loaded, the feedback about where to move to get less-loaded
access points will be provided to users. However, this approach computes the feedback in a centralized
manner from the perspective of the network, and does not take the selfish nature of users into account.
For example, it is possible that most users would choose to move to the same closest access point, which
14
would also cause serve congestion at the new access point. We note that the strategic mobility game model
in our paper works in a distributed fashion from the perspective of each individual user. For example,
each user can first inform its software agent about the set of preferable candidate locations. Then all the
software agents can apply the proposed algorithm to identify a mutually acceptable location selection
profile for all the users (i.e., Nash equilibrium of the game).
Our proposed algorithm is also relevant to the vision of having networks of mobile agents (e.g., robots)
autonomously performing sensing and communication tasks [30]. One critical issue of these networks is
how to utilize the strategic mobility to improve communication performance [30]. For example, wireless
mobile camera sensors with the purpose of reporting a static target to a data sink can improve their
reporting data rates (i.e., achieving a higher video streaming quality) by moving strategically among the
feasible locations subject to the geographical constraints of the reporting tasks. The strategic mobility
game solution in this paper, which requires no information exchange among the sensors for negotiating
the location selections, can be very useful for designing a self-organizing system for such a scenario.
A. Strategic Mobility Game with Fixed Channel Selection
We first study the case that the channel selection profile of all users is fixed, and users try to choose
proper spectrum access locations to maximize their own payoffs in a distributed manner. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the locations on the spatial domain △ are connected3, i.e., it is possible
to get to any other locations from any location. We further introduce the user specific location selection
space △n ⊆ △ to characterize user heterogeneity in mobility preference. For example, △n ⊆ △ can be
the set of preferable candidate locations input by user n to its software agent in the context of pervasive
computing. If a user n is willing to move all possible locations, then we have △n = △. If the user does
not want to move, we have △n = {dn} where dn is user n’s fixed location. As another example, △n is the
set of feasible locations to move subject to the geographical constraint of sensor n’s sensing tasks in the
context of mobile sensor networks. We then introduce the strategic mobility game Ω = (N ,d, {Un}n∈N ),
where N is the set of users, d = (d1, ...dn) ∈ Θ , △1 × ...×△N is the location profile of all users, and
Un(d,a) is the payoff of user n given the fixed channel selection profile a of all users. A location profile
d∗ = (d∗n, d
∗
−n) is a Nash equilibrium under a fixed a if and only if it satisfies that
d∗n = arg max
dn∈△n
Un(dn, d
∗
−n,a), ∀n ∈ N . (15)
3For the case that the spatial domain is not connected, it can be partitioned into multiple connected sub-domains.
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We show that
Lemma 5. The strategic mobility game Ω is a weighted potential game, with the same potential function
as Φ(d,a) in (8), and the weight wn = − log(1− pn).
The proof is given in Appendix E. According to the property of the potential game, it follows that
Theorem 3. The strategic mobility game Ω has a Nash equilibrium and the finite improvement property.
Similarly to the spatial channel selection game, we can apply the distributed learning mechanism to
achieve the Nash equilibrium. However, due to the cost of long distance traveling, it is often the case
that each user only desires to move to a new location that is close enough to its current location in each
single location update decision. For example, subject to the topological constraint, mobile sensors may can
only move to a neighboring location in each single location update. Thus, we next propose a distributed
strategic mobility algorithm that takes this local learning constraint into consideration.
B. Distributed Strategic Mobility Algorithm
We assume that each user has a traveling distance constraint ϑn, i.e., user n at location dn can only
move to a new location in the restricted set of locations △ndn , {d ∈ △n\{dn} : ||d, dn|| ≤ ϑn}. When a
user has a large enough traveling distance constraint ϑn (e.g., ϑn ≥ maxd∈△n\{dn}{||d, dn||}), we will have
△ndn = △n\{dn} and the user would like to explore all other locations in each location update decision.
When the traveling distance constraint is very small (e.g., ϑn = 0), then we have △ndn = ∅ and the user
n does not want to change its location and will not involve the location selection procedure. Furthermore,
we assume that each user n only has the information of its utility Un(d,a) through local measurement4.
Motivated by the CSMA mechanism in [31] and distributed P2P streaming algorithm in [32], we design
an efficient distributed strategic mobility algorithm by carefully coordinating users’ asynchronous location
updates to form a Markov chain (with the system state as the location profile d of all users). The details of
the algorithm are given in Algorithm 2. Here users update their locations asynchronously according to a
timer value that follows the exponential distribution5 with a rate of τn|△ndn|, where the density τn describes
4Users can adopt the similar sample average estimation approach as in distributed learning mechanism in Section IV-A.
5For ease of exposition, we have considered a Markov chain with the count-down process following an exponential distribution. It is
shown in [31], [33], [34] that the convergent stationary distribution is the same as long as the state transition process (i.e., the location update
process in our case) follows a general probability distribution with the same mean as in the exponential distribution case. This implies that
the proposed mobility algorithm can be implemented in a more practical way. For example, a user can update its location with a waiting
time based on the power law distribution, which is a common statistical property of many human activities [35]. Since we allow user specific
location update density τn in the algorithm, this further implies that the waiting time for location update can be generated by user’s demand
and activities (e.g., dialing a phone call and writing an email at a location), rather than by the artificial count-down process.
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Algorithm 2 Distributed Strategic Mobility Algorithm
1: initialization:
2: set the temperature γ and the location update density τn.
3: end initialization
4: loop for each user n in parallel:
5: generate a timer value following the exponential distribution with the mean equal to 1
τn|△ndn |
,
where dn is the current location of the user and |△ndn| is the number of feasible locations to move to
next.
6: count down until the timer expires.
7: if the timer expires then
8: record the payoff Un(d,a).
9: choose a new location d′n randomly from the set △ndn .
10: move to the new location d′n and record the payoff Un(d
′
,a).
11: stay in the new location d′n with probability e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a)+e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
OR move back
to the original location dn with probability e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a)+e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
.
12: end if
13: end loop
how often a user n updates its location. Users with higher QoS requirement may update its location more
often (i.e., with a larger timer density), in order to achieve a higher data rate. Since the exponential
distribution has support over (0,∞) and its probability density function is continuous, the probability
that more than one users generate the same timer value and update their locations simultaneously equals
zero. Furthermore, if a user n does not want to move, we have |△ndn | = 0 and hence the user n will not
update its location according to the algorithm. If a user has a set of candidate locations △ndn to move, it
will have chances to update its location selection and hence improve its utility, which also improves the
system potential Φ(d,a) by the property of potential game. In the algorithm, we will use a temperature
parameter γ to control the randomness of users’ location selections. As γ increases, a user will choose a
location of higher utility with a larger probability. As an example, the system state transition diagram of
the distributed strategic mobility Markov chain by two users is shown in Figure 4.
Since user n will randomly choose a new location d′n ∈ △ndn and stays there with probability
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a)+e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
, then the probability from state d = (dn, d−n) to d
′
= (d′n, d−n) is
given as 1|△n
dn
|
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a)+e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
. Since each user n revises its location according to the
countdown timer mechanism with a rate of τn|△ndn|, hence if d
′
n ∈ △
n
dn
, the transition rate from state d
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Fig. 4. System state transition diagram of the distributed strategic mobility Markov chain by two users. In the location map on the left
hand-side, one location is reachable directly from another location if these two locations are connected by an edge. In the transition diagram
of the Markov chain on the right hand-side, (d1, d2) denotes the system state with d1 and d2 being locations of user 1 and 2, respectively.
The transition between two system states is feasible if they are connected by a link.
to state d′ is given as
qd,d′ = τn
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a) + e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
. (16)
Otherwise, we have qd,d′ = 0. We show in Lemma 6 that the distributed strategic mobility Markov chain
is time reversible. Time reversibility means that when tracing the Markov chain backwards, the stochastic
behavior of the reverse Markov chain remains the same. A nice property of a time reversible Markov
chain is that it always admits a unique stationary distribution, which guarantees the convergence of the
distributed strategic mobility algorithm.
Lemma 6. The distributed strategic mobility algorithm induces a time-reversible Markov chain with the
unique stationary distribution
Pr(d,a) =
eγΦ(d,a)∑
d˜∈Θ e
γΦ(d˜,a)
, ∀d ∈ Θ, (17)
where Pr(d,a) is the probability that the location profile d is chosen by all users under the fixed channel
selection strategy profile a.
The proof is given in Appendix F. The key of the proof is to verify that the distribution in (17) satisfies
the detailed balance equations of the distributed strategic mobility Markov chain, i.e., Pr(d,a)qd,d′ =
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Pr(d
′
,a)q
d
′
,d
. Let Φ∗(a) = maxd∈Θ Φ(d,a) be the maximum of the potential function of the game, and
Φ¯(a) be the expected performance by the distributed strategic mobility algorithm. We have
Theorem 4. For the distributed strategic mobility algorithm, as the temperature γ → ∞, the expected
performance Φ¯(a) approaches to Φ∗(a), and the distributed strategic mobility algorithm converges to a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let Pd be the probability that the location profile d is chosen. It is well known that the
distribution Pr(d,a) in (17) is the optimal solution for the following maximization problem [36]:
max
∑
d∈Θ PdΦ(d,a)−
1
γ
∑
d∈Θ Pd logPd (18)
subject to ∑
d∈Θ Pd = 1.
Thus, as γ →∞, the problem (18) becomes the following problem
max
∑
d∈Θ PdΦ(d,a) (19)
subject to ∑
d∈Θ Pd = 1.
Let P ∗
d
be the optimal solution to problem (19). We thus know that, as γ →∞, the stationary distribution
Pr(d,a) approaches to P ∗
d
. This implies that, as γ →∞, Φ¯(a) =
∑
d∈Θ Pr(d,a)Φ(d,a) approaches to
Φ∗(a) =
∑
d∈Θ P
∗
d
Φ(d,a).
Note that in practice we can only implement a finite value of the temperature γ. The value of the
temperature γ is bounded such that the potential eγΦ(d,a) does not exceed the range of the largest predefined
real number on a personal computer. Numerical results show that the algorithm with a large enough
feasible γ can converge to a near-optimal solution such that Φ¯(a) is close to Φ∗(a). We then consider the
computational complexity of the algorithm. For each iteration of each user, Lines 4 to 15 only involve
random value generation and subduction operation for count-down, and hence have a complexity of O(1).
Suppose that it takes C iterations for the algorithm to converge. Then total computational complexity of
N users is O(CN).
C. Joint Channel Selection and Strategic Mobility
We now consider the case that each user has the flexibility to choose its location and channel simul-
taneously. Similarly to Section V-A, we formulate the problem as a joint spatial channel selection and
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mobility game Υ = (N , (d,a), {Un}n∈N ). A location and channel profile (d∗,a∗) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if it satisfies that
(d∗n, a
∗
n) = arg max
dn∈△n,an∈M
Un(dn, d
∗
−n, an, a
∗
−n), ∀n ∈ N . (20)
We show that the game Υ is also a weighted potential game.
Lemma 7. The joint spatial channel selection and mobility game Υ is a weighted potential game, with
the same potential function as Φ(d,a) in (8), and the weight wn = − log(1− pn).
Proof: Suppose that a user k changes its current location dk and channel ak to a location d′k and
channel a′k, and the system state changes from (d,a) to (d
′
,a
′
) accordingly. Then the change in the
potential function Φ is given as
Φ(d
′
,a
′
)− Φ(d,a) =Φ(d
′
,a
′
)− Φ(d
′
,a) + Φ(d
′
,a)− Φ(d,a)
=− log(1− pk)
(
Uk(d
′
,a
′
)− Uk(d
′
,a)
)
− log(1− pk)
(
Uk(d
′
,a)− Uk(d,a)
)
=− log(1− pk)
(
Uk(d
′
,a
′
)− Uk(d,a)
)
,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 7 implies the following key result.
Theorem 5. The joint spatial channel selection and mobility game has a Nash equilibrium and the finite
improvement property.
To reach a Nash equilibrium of the joint spatial channel selection and mobility game, we can run the
distributed learning mechanism for channel selection and distributed strategic mobility algorithm together.
According to the numerical results, the distributed learning mechanism can converge to a Nash equilibrium
in less than one minute (<300×100 time slots, and each time slot is assumed to be 2 milliseconds, which
is longer than one normal time-slot in the standard GSM system). Thus, we can implement the distributed
strategic mobility algorithm at a larger time-scale (say every few minutes), and implement the distributed
learning for channel selection at a smaller time scale (say every few milliseconds). Under such separation
of time scales, it is reasonable to assume that the distributed learning mechanism operating at the small
time scale achieves convergence between two updates at the large time scale. We show that
Theorem 6. With the separation of time-scales, the joint distributed learning mechanism and strategic
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mobility algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium of the joint spatial channel selection and mobility
game as the temperature γ →∞.
The proof is given in Appendix G. The key idea of the proof is that the distributed learning mechanism
globally maximizes the potential function Φ(d,a) in decision variable a given the fixed location profile
d, i.e., maxaΦ(d,a). Then the strategic mobility algorithm at the larger timescale also maximizes the
potential function Φ(d,a) in terms of decision variable d given that the channel selections are a∗
d
=
argmaxaΦ(d,a). That is, the algorithm will converge to the equilibrium such that the best location
profile d∗ with the maximum potential Φ(d∗,a∗
d
∗) will be selected. And a maximum point to the potential
function is also a Nash equilibrium of the potential game [25].
VI. UNIQUENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In previous sections, we have considered the existence of Nash equilibrium and proposed distributed
algorithms for achieving the equilibrium. We will further explore the uniqueness and efficiency of the
Nash equilibrium, which can offer more useful insights for the game theoretic approach for distributed
spectrum sharing with spatial reuse.
A. Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Due to the combinatorial nature of joint channel and location selections, the Nash equilibrium of the
game is not unique in general. For example, we consider a game with two users N = {1, 2}, two channels
M = {1, 2}, and two locations ∆ = {d1, d2}. Two locations are close such that ||d1, d2|| ≤ δ, and both
users and channels are homogeneous such that θm = θ, Bnm,dn = B, pn = p. In this case, there are eight
Nash equilibria ((d1, d2), (a1, a2)) for the game, i.e., ((d1, d1) , (1, 2)), ((d2, d2) , (1, 2)), ((d1, d1) , (2, 1)),
((d2, d2) , (2, 1)),((d1, d2) , (1, 2)), ((d1, d2) , (2, 1)), ((d2, d1) , (1, 2)), and ((d2, d1) , (2, 1)).
In general, selecting from multiple Nash equilibria is quite hard, and the proposed algorithm is guar-
anteed to converge to one of the Nash equilibria.
B. Price of Anarchy
Since the Nash equilibrium is typically not unique, we then study the efficiency of Nash equilibria.
Following the definition of price of anarchy (PoA) in game theory [7], we will quantify the efficiency
ratio of the worst-case Nash equilibrium over the centralized optimal solution. We first consider the spatial
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channel selection game with a fixed spectrum access location profile d. Let Ξ be the set of Nash equilibria
of the game. Then the PoA is defined as
PoA =
mina∈Ξ
∑
n∈N Un(d,a)
maxa∈MN
∑
n∈N Un(d,a)
,
which is always not greater than 1. A larger PoA implies that the set of Nash equilibrium is more efficient
(in the worst-case sense) using the centralized optimum as a benchmark. Let ̟ = maxn∈N{− log(1−pn)},
E(d) = minn∈N maxm∈M
{
log
(
θmB
n
m,dn
pn
)}
, and K(d) = maxn∈N{|Nn(d)|}. We can show that
Theorem 7. For the spatial channel selection game with a fixed spectrum access location profile d, the
PoA is no less than 1− K(d)̟
E(d)
.
The proof is given in Appendix H. Intuitively, when users are less aggressive in channel contention (i.e.,
̟ is smaller) and users are more homogeneous in term of channel utilization (i.e., E(d) is larger), the
worst-case Nash equilibrium is closer to the centralized optimum and hence the PoA is larger. Moreover,
Theorem 7 implies that we can increase the efficiency of spectrum sharing by better utilizing the gain of
spatial reuse (i.e., reducing the interference edges K(d) on the interference graph). Similarly, by defining
that η = maxd∈Θ{K(d)E(d)}, we see that the PoA of the joint spatial channel selection and mobility game is
no less than 1− η̟.
The PoA characterizes the worst-case performance of Nash equilibria. Numerical results in Section VII
demonstrate that the convergent Nash equilibrium of the proposed algorithm is often more efficient and
has a less than 8% performance loss, compared with the centralized optimal solution.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now evaluate the proposed algorithms by simulations. We consider a Rayleigh fading channel
environment. The data rate of secondary user n on an idle channel m at location d is given as bnm,d = hdbnm.
Here hd is a location dependent parameter. Parameter bnm is the data rate computed according to the
Shannon capacity, i.e., bnm = Bm log2(1 +
ζng
n
m
ωn
m,d
), where Bm is the bandwidth of channel m, ζn is the
power adopted by user n, ωnm,d is the noise power, and gnm is the channel gain (a realization of a random
variable that follows the exponential distribution with the mean g¯nm). In the following simulations, we set
Bm = 10 MHz, ωnm,d = −100 dBm, and ζn = 100 mW. By choosing different location parameter hd
and mean channel gain g¯nm, we have different mean data rates E[bnm,d] = Bnm,d = hdE[bnm] = hdBnm for
different channels, locations, and users. For simplicity, we set the channel availabilities θm = 0.5.
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Fig. 5. Interference graphs
A. Distributed Learning For Spatial Channel Selection
We first evaluate the distributed learning algorithm for channel selection with fixed user locations. For
the distributed learning algorithm initialization, we set the length of each decision period K = 100, which
can achieve a good estimation of the expected payoff. For the smoothing factor µT , a higher value can
lead to a faster convergence. We hence set µT = 1T , which has the fastest convergence while satisfying
the convergence condition in Theorem 2.
Since locations are fixed, we set the location parameter hd = 1. We consider a network of M = 5
channels and N = 9 users with four different interference graphs (see Figure 5). Graphs (a), (b) and (c)
are the commonly-used regular interference graphs, and Graph (d) is a randomly-generated non-regular
interference graph. Let ~Bn = (Bn1 , ..., BnM) be the mean data rate vector of user n on M channels. We
set ~B1 = ~B2 = ~B3 = (0.1, 0.3, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5) Mbps, ~B4 = ~B5 = ~B6 = (0.2, 0.6, 1.6, 2.0, 3.0) Mbps, and
~B7 = ~B8 = ~B9 = (0.5, 1.5, 4.0, 5.0, 7.5) Mbps. The fixed channel contention probabilities pn of the users
are randomly assigned from the set {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}.
Let us first look at the convergence dynamics, using graph (d) in Figure 5 as an example. Figure 6
shows the learning dynamics of user 4 in terms of the channel selection probabilities on 5 channels. It
demonstrates the convergence of the distributed learning algorithm. Figure 7 shows the learning dynamics
of the potential function value Φ. We see that the distributed learning algorithm can lead the potential
function of the spatial channel selection game to the maximum point, which is a Nash equilibrium
according to the property of potential game.
To benchmark the performance of the distributed learning algorithm, we compare it with the solution
obtained by the centralized global optimization of maxa
∑
n∈N Un(d,a) on all the interference graphs.
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Fig. 6. Learning dynamics of user 4’s channel selection probabilities
Fig. 7. Learning dynamics of potential function value
The results are shown in Figure 8. We see that the performance loss of the distributed learning is less
than 5% in all cases.
We look at another network with N = 50 users randomly scattered across a square area of a side-
length of 250m (see Figure 9). We set users’ transmission range δ = 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100m, respectively.
Figure 10 shows the performance comparison between distributed learning and the centralized optimiza-
tion solution. As the transmission range δ increases, the performances of both distributed learning and
centralized global optimization solutions decrease. In all cases, the performance loss of the distributed
learning algorithm is less than 8%, compared with the centralized global optimization solution. This shows
the efficiency of distributed learning algorithm.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of distributed learning and global optimization
Fig. 9. A square area of a length of 250m with 50 scattered users with an transmission range δ = 60m. Each user is represented by a dot
and two users interfere with each other if they are connected by an edge.
B. Joint Distributed Learning and Strategic Mobility
We next study the joint distributed learning and strategic mobility algorithm. We consider a location
map as shown in graph (a) of Figure 11. Black cells are obstacles, and no users can move there. Each
user in a cell can interfere with those users within the same cell and the ones in neighboring cells (along
the line and diagonal). Each user initially locates in the same cell in the bottom left corner, and is allowed
to move to the neighboring cells once it gets the chance to update its location. Each cell is randomly
assigned with a location parameter hd from the set {0.5, 1.0, 2.0}, and each user has different mean data
rates Bnm as specified in Section VII-A.
We implement the joint algorithm with the temperature γ = 10, 20, and 50, respectively. The location
update process follows the exponential distribution with a mean of 10. We show in Figure 11 users’
locations and channel selections at the iteration step t = 2, 50, and 100, respectively (with the temperature
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Fig. 10. Comparison of distributed learning and global optimization with different transmission ranges δ
γ = 50). We observe that users try to spread out in terms of physical locations and meanwhile choose
channels with higher data rates, in order to maximize their payoffs. From Figure 12, we see that the
performance of the algorithm improves as the temperature γ increases, and the convergence time also
increases accordingly. When γ = 50, the performance loss of the joint algorithm is less than 6%, compared
with the global optimal solution, i.e., maxd,a
∑
n∈N Un(d,a). This shows the efficiency of the Nash
equilibrium. When users are static (without strategic mobility) and close-by, the performance loss of the
distributed learning for channel selection can be as high as 18%, which justifies the motivations for the
strategic mobility design.
We further implement simulations where the temperature γ = 50 and the location update process follows
the uniform distribution and power law distribution with the same mean as in the exponential distribution
case, respectively. The results in Figure 13 verify that the convergent system performance is the same
as long as the location update process follows a general probability distribution with the same mean as
in the exponential distribution case. Moreover, we observe that the convergence time increases when the
distribution has a longer tail (e.g., power law distribution). This is because that a small fraction of users
would have a longer waiting time for the location update when a long-tailed distribution is implemented.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we generalize the spatial congestion game framework for distributed spectrum access
mechanism design with spatial reuse. We consider both the spatial channel selection game and the
joint spatial channel selection and mobility game, and propose distributed algorithms using users’ local
information that converge to the Nash equilibria for both games. Numerical results verify that Nash
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Fig. 11. Dynamics of users’ locations and channel selections with the temperature γ = 50
Fig. 12. Dynamics of time average system utility with location update process following the exponential distribution and the temperature
γ = 10, 20, and 50, respectively
equilibria are quite efficient and have less than 8% performance loss, compared with the centralized
optimal solutions.
For the future work, we are going to investigate the distributed spectrum sharing mechanism design
with spatial reuse that can achieve the centralized optimal solution.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
For the ease of exposition, we first define ρi , log(1− pi), ξim,d , log(θmBim,dpi), and
Φmi (d,a) = −ρi

1
2
∑
j∈Nmi (d,a)
ρj + ξ
i
m,di

 I{ai=m}.
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Fig. 13. Dynamics of time average system utility with the location update process following different distributions and the temperature
γ = 50
Thus, we have Φ(d,a) =
∑N
i=1
∑M
m=1Φ
m
i (d,a).
Now suppose that a user k unilaterally changes its strategy ak to a
′
k. Let a′ = (a1, ..., ak−1, a
′
k, ak+1, ..., aN)
be the new strategy profile. Thus, the change in potential Φ from a to a′ is given by
Φ(d,a
′
)− Φ(d,a) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
Φmi (d,a
′
)−
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
Φmi (d,a)
=
M∑
m=1
Φmk (d,a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (d,a) +
∑
i∈Nk(d)
M∑
m=1
Φmi (d,a
′
)−
∑
i∈Nk(d)
M∑
m=1
Φmi (d,a)
=
(
M∑
m=1
Φmk (d,a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (d,a)
)
+
∑
i∈Nk(d)
(
Φ
a
′
k
i (d,a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (d,a)
)
+
∑
i∈Nk(d)
(
Φaki (d,a
′
)− Φaki (d,a)
)
.
(21)
Equation (21) consists of three parts. Next we analyze each part separately. For the first part, we have
M∑
m=1
Φmk (d,a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (d,a)
=Φ
a
′
k
k (d,a
′
)− Φakk (d,a) = −ρk

12
∑
j∈N
a
′
k
k
(d,a
′
)
ρj + ξ
k
a
′
k
,dk

+ ρk

1
2
∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
ρj + ξ
k
ak,dk

 . (22)
For the second part in (21),
Φ
a
′
k
i (d,a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (d,a)
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=− ρi

12
∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (d,a
′)
ρj + ξ
i
a
′
k
,di

 I{ai=a′k} + ρi

12
∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (d,a)
ρj + ξ
i
a
′
k
,di

 I{ai=a′k}
=−
1
2
ρi

 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i
(d,a′ )
ρj −
∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i
(d,a)
ρj

 I{ai=a′k} = −12ρiρkI{ai=a′k}.
This means
∑
i∈Nk(d)
(
Φ
a
′
k
i (d,a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (d,a)
)
=
∑
i∈Nk(d)
−
1
2
ρiρkI{ai=a′k}
= −
1
2
ρk
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k
(d,a′)
ρi. (23)
For the third term in (21), we can similarly get
∑
i∈Nk(d)
(
Φaki (d,a
′
)− Φaki (d,a)
)
=
1
2
ρk
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k
(d,a)
ρi. (24)
Substituting (22), (23), and (24) into (21), we obtain
Φ(d,a
′
)− Φ(d,a)
=− ρk

 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
k
(d,a
′
)
ρj + ξ
k
a
′
k
,dk
−
∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
ρj − ξ
k
ak,dk

 = −ρk (Uk(d,a′)− Uk(d,a)) . (25)
Since 0 < pk < 1 and hence − log(1 − pk) > 0, we can conclude that Φ(d,a) defining in (8) is a
weighted potential function with the weight − log(1− pk).
B. Proof of Lemma 3
We complete the proof by checking the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 in [26](pp.127).
(a) Since 0 < θm, pn < 1 and bnm,d is bounded, then Un(T ) must be also bounded. It follows that
|Un(T )(I{an(T )=m} − σ
n
m(T ))| <∞. Thus, supT E[|Un(T )(I{an(T )=m} − σnm(T ))|2] <∞.
(b) First, we can obtain from (11) that
dσnm(T )
dT
= lim
µT→0
σnm(T + 1)− σ
n
m(T )
µT
= Un(T )(I{an(T )=m} − σ
n
m(T )). (26)
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By taking the expectation of the RHS of (26) with respective to σ(T ), we have
E[Un(T )(I{an(T )=m} − σ
n
m(T ))|σ(T )] =σ
n
m(T )(1− σ
n
m(T ))V
n
m(σ(T )) +
∑
i 6=m
σni (T )(1− σ
n
m(T ))V
n
i (σ(T ))
=σnm(T )
M∑
i=1
σni (T )(V
n
m(σ(T ))− V
n
i (σ(T ))).
(c) First, V nm(σ(T )) = E[Un(T )|σ(T ), an(T ) = m] is an expectation function, and hence is differen-
tiable. It then follows that σnm(T )
∑M
i=1 σ
n
i (T )(V
n
m(σ(T ))− V
n
i (σ(T ))) is also differentiable because the
sum of differentiable functions is also differentiable. Thus σnm(T )
∑M
i=1 σ
n
i (T )(V
n
m(σ(T ))−V
n
i (σ(T ))) is
continuous.
(d) We have ∑T µT =∞ and ∑T µ2T <∞ by assumption.
(e) Since the sample average estimation is unbiased, the noise term is hence the martingale difference
noise. Then the expected biased error βT = 0. It follows that
∑
T µT |βT | <∞ with probability one.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Let a = (i, a−n) and a
′
= (j, a−n). By the definition of V nn (σ(T )), we first have that
V ni (σ(T ))− V
n
j (σ(T ))
=E

log

θanBnan,dnpn ∏
n′∈N ann (d,an,a−n)
(1− pn′)

 |an = i,σ(T )


−E

log

θanBnan,dnpn ∏
n′∈N ann (d,an,a−n)
(1− pn′)

 |an = j,σ(T )


=E

log

θiBni,dnpn ∏
n′∈N in(d,a)
(1− pn′)

− log

θjBnj,dnpn ∏
n′∈N jn(d,a
′ )
(1− pn′)

 |σ−n(T )


=
∑
a−n

log θiBni,dnpn ∏
n′∈N in(d,a)
(1− pn′)− log θjB
n
j,dn
pn
∏
n′∈N jn(d,a
′
)
(1− pn′)

Pr{a−n|σ−n(T )} (27)
According to (25), we have
log

θiBni,dnpn ∏
n′∈N in(d,a)
(1− pn′)

− log

θjBnj,dnpn ∏
n′∈N jn(d,a
′)
(1− pn′)


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=
1
− log(1− pn)
N∑
k=1
− log(1− pk)

1
2
∑
n′∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
log(1− pn′) + log θakB
k
ak ,dk
pk


−
1
− log(1− pn)
N∑
k=1
− log(1− pk)

1
2
∑
n′∈N
ak
k
(d,a′ )
log(1− pn′) + log θakB
k
ak,dk
pk

 . (28)
By (27) and (28), it follows that
− log(1− pn)
(
V ni (σ(T ))− V
n
j (σ(T ))
)
=
∑
a−n
Pr{a−n|σ−n(T )}
(
N∑
k=1
− log(1− pk)

1
2
∑
n′∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
log(1− pn′) + log θakB
k
ak ,dk
pk


−
N∑
k=1
− log(1− pk)

1
2
∑
n′∈N
ak
k
(d,a′)
log(1− pn′) + log θakB
k
ak ,dk
pk




=Lni (σ(T ))− L
n
j (σ(T )),
which completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
We first consider the variation of L(σ(T )) along the trajectories of ODE in (12), i.e., differentiating
L(σ(T )) with respective to time T ,
dL(σ(T ))
dT
=
M∑
j=1
dL(σ(T ))
dσnj (T )
dσnj (T )
dT
=
M∑
j=1
Lnj (σ(T ))σ
n
j (T )
M∑
i=1
σni (T )
(
V nj (σ(T ))− V
n
i (σ(T ))
)
=
1
2
M∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
σnj (T )σ
n
i (T )
(
V nj (σ(T ))− V
n
i (σ(T ))
) (
Lnj (σ(T ))− L
n
i (σ(T ))
)
. (29)
According to Lemma 4, we have dL(σ(T ))
dT
≥ 0. Hence L(σ(T )) is non-decreasing along the trajectories
of the ODE (12). According to [37], the learning mechanism converges to a stationary point σ∗ such that
dL(σ∗)
dT
= 0, i.e., (∀i, j ∈ M, n ∈ N )
σn∗j σ
n∗
i (V
n
j (σ
∗)− V ni (σ
∗))(Lnj (σ
∗)− Lni (σ
∗)) = σn∗j σ
n∗
i (V
n
j (σ
∗)− V ni (σ
∗))2 = 0. (30)
According to (12) and (30), we have dσn∗m
dT
= 0, ∀m ∈M, n ∈ N .
31
If σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, it must satisfy that
V ni (σ
∗) ≤
M∑
j=1
σn∗j V
n
j (σ
∗), ∀n ∈ N , i ∈M. (31)
If σ∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, we must have that there is some n and i such that V ni (σ∗) >
∑M
j=1 σ
n∗
j V
n
j (σ
∗).
Due to the continuity of the expectation function V ni , the inequality will still hold in a small open
neighborhood around σ∗. Then it follows from (12) that, for all points σˆ in this neighborhood of σ∗ that
satisfy σˆni 6= 0, we have
dσˆni
dT
= σˆni (V
n
i (σˆ)−
M∑
j=1
σˆnj V
n
j (σˆ)) > 0.
Hence in all sufficiently small neighborhoods of σ∗, there will be infinitely many points starting from which
σˆ will eventually leave the neighborhood. Thus, the learning mechanism must asymptotically converge
to a stable stationary point σ∗ that satisfies (31), which is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, according to
the Sard’s theorem [38], when the ODE (12) asymptotically converges, the converging equilibrium is not
contained in the interior of the mixed strategy polytope [39]. That is, for each user n, there exists only one
channel selection a∗n ∈M such that σn∗m = 1 if m = a∗n and σn∗m = 0 otherwise. The learning mechanism
hence converges to a Nash equilibrium with pure strategy profile.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that a user k changes its location dk to the location d
′
k. Let d
′
= (d1, .., dk−1, d
′
k, dk+1, ..., dN).
Recall that ρi = log(1 − pi) and ξim,d = log(θmBim,dpi) as defined in Appendix A. Then the change in
potential Φ from d to d′ is given by
Φ(d
′
,a)− Φ(d,a) = −ρk(ξ
k
ak,d
′
k
− ξkak,dk) +
N∑
i=1
−
1
2
ρi

 ∑
j∈N
ai
i
(d
′
,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N
ai
i (d,a)
ρj

 . (32)
For the last term, we have
N∑
i=1
−
1
2
ρi

 ∑
j∈N
ai
i (d
′
,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N
ai
i (d,a)
ρj


=−
1
2
ρk

 ∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d
′
,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
ρj

− 1
2
∑
n∈N
I{n∈Nk(d
′
,a)∪Nk(d,a)}
ρn

 ∑
j∈N ann (d
′,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N ann (d,a)
ρj


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=−
1
2
ρk

 ∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d
′
,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
ρj

− 1
2
∑
n∈N
I{n∈Nk(d
′
,a)∪Nk(d,a)}
ρnρk
(
I{n∈N ak
k
(d′,a)} − I{n∈N ak
k
(d,a)}
)
=−
1
2
ρk

 ∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d
′
,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
ρj

− 1
2
ρk
∑
n∈N
I{n∈Nk(d
′
,a)∪Nk(d,a)}
I{n∈N ak
k
(d′,a)}ρn
+
1
2
ρk
∑
n∈N
I{n∈Nk(d
′
,a)∪Nk(d,a)}
I{n∈N ak
k
(d,a)}ρn
=− ρk

 ∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d
′
,a)
ρj −
∑
j∈N
ak
k
(d,a)
ρj

 . (33)
Combing (32) and (33), we have Φ(d′,a)− Φ(d,a) = − log(1− pk)
(
Uk(d
′
,a)− Uk(d,a)
)
.
F. Proof of Lemma 6
As mentioned, the system state of the distributed strategic mobility Markov chain is defined as the
location profile d ∈ Θ of all users. Since distance measure is symmetry, we have that if d′ ∈ △nd then
d ∈ △n
d
′ . Further, since all locations on the spatial domain ∆ are connected, all system states d hence can
reach each other within a finite number of transitions, and the resulting finite Markov chain is irreducible
and aperiodic. The process is thus ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution.
We then show the Markov chain is time reversible by checking the following detailed balance equations
are satisfied:
Pr(d,a)qd,d′ = Pr(d
′
,a)q
d
′
,d
, ∀d,d
′
∈ Θ, (34)
where qd,d′ is the transition rate from state d = (d1, ..., dN) to state d
′
= (d
′
1, ..., d
′
N). According to the
algorithm, we know that the set of states that is directed connected to the state d are the one where d
and d′ differ by exactly one user, say user n, such that di = d
′
i, ∀i 6= n and dn 6= d
′
n.
Since user n revises its location by the timer mechanism, according the system state transition rate in
(16), we have that
Pr(d,a)qd,d′ = τn
eγΦ(d,a)∑
d˜∈dN e
γΦ(d˜,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a) + e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
. (35)
Similarly, we obtain that
Pr(d,a)qd,d′ = τn
eγΦ(d
′
,a)∑
d˜∈dN e
γΦ(d˜,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a) + e− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a)
. (36)
33
Since the strategic mobility game is a potential game, we have
Φ(d
′
,a)− Φ(d,a) = − log(1− pn)
(
Un(d
′
,a)− Un(d,a)
)
. (37)
Combing (35), (36) and (37), we have detailed balance equation (34) hold. The Markov chain is hence
time-reversible and has the stationary distribution given in (17).
G. Proof of Theorem 6
According to Theorem 2, we know the distributed learning algorithm can converge to the Nash equi-
librium of the spatial channel selection game. Let a∗
d
be the Nash equilibrium by the distributed learning
algorithm when the location profile of all users are d. Since the Nash equilibrium of the potential game
is also a maximum point to the potential function, we have a∗
d
= argmaxaΦ(d,a).
Similarly as the analysis of the distributed strategic mobility algorithm in Lemma 6, we define the
system state of the joint channel selection and strategic mobility Markov chain as the location profile
d ∈ Θ of all users. Since distance measure is symmetry, we have that if d′ ∈ △nd then d ∈ △nd′ . Further,
since all locations on the spatial domain ∆ are connected, all system states d hence can reach each other
within a finite number of transitions, and the resulting finite Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
We then show the Markov chain is time reversible by checking the following detailed balance equations
are satisfied:
Pr(d)qd,d′ = Pr(d
′
)q
d
′
,d
, ∀d,d
′
∈ Θ, (38)
where qd,d′ is the transition rate from state d = (d1, ..., dN) to state d
′
= (d
′
1, ..., d
′
N). According to the
algorithm, we know that the set of states that is directed connected to the state d are the one where d and
d
′ differ by exactly one user, say user n, such that di = d
′
i∀i 6= n and dn 6= d
′
n. Since the user n revise its
location by the timer mechanism, we know that the rate of revision is equal to τn|△ndn|. Since user n will
randomly choose a new location d′n and stays there with probability e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′ )
e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a
∗
d
)
+e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′
)
,
the probability from state d to d′ is then given as 1|△n
dn
|
e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′ )
e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a
∗
d
)
+e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′
)
. Thus ,the
transition rate from state d to d′ is give as
qd,d′ = τn
e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′ )
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a
∗
d
) + e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′
)
. (39)
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It follows that
Pr(d)qd,d′ = τn
eγΦ(d,a
∗
d
)∑
d˜∈dN e
γΦ(d˜,a∗
d˜
)
e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′ )
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a
∗
d
) + e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′
)
. (40)
Similarly, we obtain that
Pr(d
′
)q
d
′
,d
= τn
e
γΦ(d
′
,a∗
d
′
)∑
d˜∈dN e
γΦ(d˜,a∗
d˜
)
e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a∗
d
′
)
e− log(1−pn)γUn(d,a
∗
d
) + e
− log(1−pn)γUn(d
′
,a∗
d
′
)
. (41)
Since the joint channel selection and strategic mobility game is a potential game, we have
Φ(d
′
,a∗
d
′ )− Φ(d,a∗d) = − log(1− pn)
(
Un(d
′
,a∗
d
′ )− Un(d,a
∗
d
)
)
. (42)
Combing (40), (41) and (42), we have detailed balance equation (38) holds. The Markov chain is hence
time-reversible and has the unique stationary distribution given as Pr(d) = e
γΦ(d,a∗
d
)
∑
d˜∈dN
e
γΦ(d˜,a∗
d˜
)
,d ∈ Θ.
With the similar proof as in Theorem 4, we can hence show that, as γ →∞, the algorithm approaches the
equilibrium such that Φ(d,a∗
d
) is maximized in term of decision variable d, i.e., maxd Φ(d,a∗d). Further-
more, we can show that maxdΦ(d,a∗d) = maxd,aΦ(d,a) by contradiction. Let d∗ = argmaxdΦ(d,a∗d)
and (d¯, a¯) = argmaxd,aΦ(d,a). Suppose that Φ(d∗,a∗d∗) < Φ(d¯, a¯). Since the learning algorithm
maximizes the potential Φ(d,a) given a location profile d, we have that Φ(d¯,a∗
d¯
) = maxaΦ(d¯,a) ≥
Φ(d¯, a¯). It follows that Φ(d¯,a∗
d¯
) ≥ Φ(d¯, a¯) > Φ(d∗,a∗
d
∗), which contradicts with that Φ(d∗,a∗
d
∗) =
maxdΦ(d,a
∗
d
) ≥ Φ(d¯,a∗
d¯
). Since the joint spatial channel selection and mobility game is a potential game,
we know that the maximum point Φ(d∗,a∗
d
∗) of the potential function must be a Nash equilibrium.
H. Proof of Theorem 7
For the ease of exposition, we first define that En(d) = maxm∈M
{
log
(
θmB
n
m,dn
pn
)}
and hence we
have E(d) = minn∈N{En(d)}. Since 0 < pn < 1, we have log(1− pn) < 0. It follows from (5) that
Un(d,a) ≤ En(d). (43)
Thus,
max
a
∑
n∈N
Un(d,a) ≤
∑
n∈N
En(d). (44)
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Suppose that a˜ ∈ Ξ is an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of the spatial channel selection game. Then at Nash
equilibrium, we must have that
Un(d, a˜) ≥ En(d) +
∑
i∈Nn(d)
log(1− pi). (45)
Otherwise, the user n always can improve its payoff by choosing the channel that maximizes log
(
θmB
n
m,dn
pn
)
.
According to (44) and (45), we then obtain
PoA ≥
∑
n∈N Un(d, a˜)
maxa
∑
n∈N Un(d,a)
≥
∑
n∈N
(
En(d) +
∑
i∈Nn(d)
log(1− pi)
)
∑
n∈N En(d)
= 1 +
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈Nn(d)
log(1− pi)∑
n∈N En(d)
≥ 1−
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈Nn(d)
̟∑
n∈N En(d)
≥ 1−
∑
n∈N K(d)̟
NE(d)
≥ 1−
K(d)̟
E(d)
. (46)
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